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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 00-3698 
 
JANICE B. LECKEY; JANICE B. LECKEY, Executrix of the 
Estate of Evelyn O. Knapp, a/k/a Evelyn Olliffe Knapp, 
Deceased a/k/a JANICE BURGER LECKEY, 
 
       Appellants 
 
v. 
 
PAUL W. STEFANO; FRANK W. JONES, Administrators of 
the Estate of William E. Knapp, Deceased, and Trustees 
of the Insurance Trust of William Knapp, Deceased 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
(Dist. Court No. 95-cv-00108) 
District Court Judge: Robert J. Cindrich 
 
Argued on July 12, 2001 
 
Before: SLOVITER, ALITO, and GREENBERG, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 20, 2001) 
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       Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan & 
        Conboy 
       312 Boulevard of the Allies, 
        8th Floor 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
 
       Edward C. Leckey 
       1035 5th Avenue 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 
       Counsel for Appellants  
 
       HARRY F. KUNSELMAN 
       DAVID A. STRASSBURGER (Argued) 
       Strassburger, McKenna, Gutnick & 
       Potter 
       322 Boulevard of the Allies, 
        Suite 700 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
 
       Counsel for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Plaintiffs brought suit under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. S 1001 et 
seq., as amended by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 
("REA"), Pub. L. No. 98-397, challenging distributions made 
by William Knapp ("William") from a Pension Plan and a 
Profit Sharing Plan without the consent of his wife, Evelyn 
Knapp ("Evelyn"). The District Court found that neither 
plan was governed by ERISA and therefore dismissed the 
suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As both plans 
were covered by ERISA, we reverse the order of the District 
Court and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
In 1985, William incorporated a family business named 
American Carbyde ("AmCarb"). That same year, AmCarb 
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established a Profit Sharing Plan and corresponding Profit 
Sharing Trust. The Profit Sharing Trust was funded 
through a rollover of William's assets from profit sharing 
and pension plans from two prior jobs. The Profit Sharing 
Plan provided that distributions from the plan were to be 
made as a joint and survivor annuity, unless the 
participant's spouse consented to waive that requirement. 
 
In December 1986, AmCarb also adopted a Pension Plan. 
AmCarb made contributions to the Pension Trust for 1986 
and 1987. Like the Profit Sharing Plan, the Pension Plan 
provided that, absent the written, attested consent of the 
participant's spouse, distributions from the Pension Trust 
were to be made as joint and survivor annuities. 
 
In 1992, William, who served as administrator of the 
Profit Sharing Trust, transferred trust assets to various 
individual retirement accounts ("IRAs") without the consent 
of his wife, Evelyn. William opened the IRAs in his own 
name and designated as the beneficiary an Insurance Trust 
that he had created. When William died on February 16, 
1993, the assets from these IRAs were distributed to the 
Insurance Trust, which provided Evelyn with an income 
stream until her death. 
 
Similarly, in 1992, William, who administered the 
Pension Plan as president of AmCarb, transferred securities 
and other assets from the Pension Trust to his personal 
brokerage account. In May 1992, he returned $10,386 to 
the Pension Plan's checking account and distributed this 
sum to his step-daughter, Janice Leckey ("Janice"). He then 
closed the Pension Trust's checking account, depositing the 
remaining funds in his personal checking account. Evelyn 
never consented to these transfers from the Pension Trust. 
William obtained approval from the Internal Revenue 
Service to terminate the Pension Plan effective December 
31, 1991. 
 
In January 1995, Evelyn, as William's spouse and the 
remaining beneficiary of the Pension and Profit Sharing 
Plans, and Janice, as the surviving trustee of the Profit 
Sharing and Pension Trusts, brought suit under ERISA, as 
amended by the REA. Plaintiffs claimed that William 
violated Section 205 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1055, by 
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withdrawing funds from the Pension and Profit Sharing 
Plans without Evelyn's consent and without using a joint 
and survivor annuity. Section 205 requires, as a general 
rule, "that a participant's benefits be paid in the form of a 
joint/survivor annuity unless the participant's spouse 
consents in writing to a different mode of payment." 
Appendix at 4a-5a ("App."); see 29 U.S.C. S 1055(a), (c), (g), 
(k). Plaintiffs also alleged that these unlawful withdrawals 
violated William's statutory duties to Evelyn and his 
fiduciary duties as administrator of the plans. Plaintiffs 
requested an order requiring the return of the assets that 
William had unlawfully distributed from the Profit Sharing 
Trust, as well as an order compelling the trustees of the 
Insurance Trust to obtain a refund of inheritance taxes 
paid on the assets that were transferred to William's IRAs. 
Plaintiffs likewise sought the funds that William transferred 
from the Pension Trust, together with interest on those 
funds.1 Plaintiffs named Paul Stefano and Frank Jones, the 
administrators of William's estate and trustees of the 
Insurance Trust, as defendants. 
 
After one unsuccessful attempt to obtain summary 
judgment, the defendants moved for reconsideration of their 
motion for summary judgment. In response, the District 
Court held that neither the Profit Sharing Plan nor the 
Pension Plan was governed by ERISA and dismissed the 
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by order entered 
August 15, 2000. Plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend this 
order was denied on October 3, 2000, whereupon plaintiffs 
filed this appeal.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. After Evelyn died on December 13, 1997, Janice, in her capacity as 
executrix of Evelyn's estate, was substituted for Evelyn as a plaintiff. 
 
2. The defendants assert that plaintiffs improperly included and rely on 
documents in the appendix that were submitted after summary 
judgment was granted. Appellees' Brief at 6. Plaintiffs reply by arguing 
that the District Court accepted and responded to facts supported by 
these documents, thereby incorporating subsequently submitted 
documents into the record. Reply at 3-4. We need not dwell on this issue 
since defendants concede certain facts regarding AmCarb's ownership 
and the participants in the plans that are sufficient to resolve this 
appeal. 
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II. 
 
Plaintiffs' suit was brought under Title I of ERISA. See, 
e.g., 29 U.S.C. S 1055. The Department of Labor has issued 
regulations to help identify plans that qualify as"employee 
benefit plans" covered by Title I. 29 C.F.R.S 2510.3-3(a). 
Those regulations define "employee benefit plan" to exclude 
"any plan . . . under which no employees are participants 
covered under the plan." 29 C.F.R. S 2510.3-3(b). In 
determining whether there are employees covered by a 
plan, the regulations mandate that "[a]n individual and his 
or her spouse shall not be deemed to be employees with 
respect to a trade or business . . . which is wholly owned 
by the individual or by the individual and by his or her 
spouse." 29 C.F.R. S 2510.3-3(c)(1). This appeal turns on 
the interpretation of this final provision. 
 
Under the regulation, we must determine whether both 
the Pension Plan and the Profit Sharing Plan had at least 
one employee-participant. With respect to the Profit Sharing 
Plan, the defendants contend that, when the alleged 
distributions occurred,3 William was the only participant 
and had been the only participant since 1988. Appellees' 
Brief at 5, 8, 11, 19; see also Appellants' Brief at 22; App. 
at 3a. With respect to the Pension Plan, both sides agree 
that William and Janice were participants in the Pension 
Plan. Appellants' Brief at 22; Appellees' Brief at 5, 11, 19; 
App. at 4a. Thus, in order for the Profit Sharing Plan to be 
covered by ERISA, William must be counted as an 
employee, and in order for the Pension Plan to be covered 
either William or Janice must be counted as an employee. 
William and Janice were participants in both plans as a 
result of their employment with AmCarb but, as noted, 
under the regulation, an individual and the individual's 
spouse are not counted as employees for purposes of 
identifying an ERISA plan if the trade or business is "wholly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Defendants urge us to determine whether the plans are covered by 
ERISA at the time of the alleged distributions rather than at some earlier 
point, as the plans may have covered other employees at an earlier time. 
We need not decide when a plan's ERISA status ought to be determined 
or whether a plan may lose its ERISA status by attrition as we conclude 
that even at the time of the alleged distributions, both plans were 
governed by ERISA. 
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owned by the individual or by the individual and his or her 
spouse." 29 C.F.R. S 2510.3-3(c)(1). Here, at the time of the 
alleged distributions, AmCarb was owned by William, his 
wife Evelyn, and his step-daughter Janice. Appellees' Brief 
at 5, 19. If we read the regulation literally to apply only 
when a company is owned by an individual or by spouses, 
Janice's ownership requires that both she and William be 
counted as employees and means that both plans are 
covered by ERISA. 
 
The District Court, however, concluded that neither plan 
was governed by ERISA at the time of the distributions 
because AmCarb was wholly owned by "immediate family 
members." In reaching this decision, the court relied on 
this Court's opinion in Matinchek v. John Alden Life Ins. 
Co., 93 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 1996). In Matinchek , Mr. and Mrs. 
Matinchek were the sole owners of a funeral home. 
Matinchek, 93 F.3d at 102. Mr. Matinchek enrolled in a 
group health insurance plan provided by the John Alden 
Life Insurance Company. Id. at 97-98. In his application, 
Mr. Matinchek made several misrepresentations regarding 
his medical history and condition. Id. at 98. Based on this 
application, John Alden issued a policy covering Mr. and 
Mrs. Matinchek. Id. After discovering Mr. Matinchek's 
misrepresentation, John Alden rescinded the policy and 
refused to pay Mr. Matinchek's claims arising from his 
February 1992 hospitalization and a May 1992 accident. Id. 
at 98-99. Mr. Matinchek sued. The District Court found 
that the suit was governed by ERISA. Id. at 99. 
 
A panel of our Court disagreed. The Court noted that 
Department of Labor regulations exclude from ERISA's 
coverage those plans that do not cover any employees. Id. 
at 100. The Court also noted the rule that "[a]n individual 
and his or her spouse [are] not . . . deemed to be employees 
with respect to a trade or business . . . which is wholly 
owned by the individual or by the individual and his or her 
spouse." Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. S 2510.3-3(c)(1)). In light of 
these regulations, the Court held "that an insurance 
coverage plan covering only a sole business owner and his 
or her immediate family members cannot qualify as an 
employee welfare benefit plan covered by ERISA." Id. at 
101. In a footnote, the Court went on to "note that this 
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holding applies to all businesses solely-owned by immediate 
family members, regardless of whether the owners are sole 
proprietors, sole shareholders, or partners." Id. at 101 n.3. 
 
Based on this footnote, the District Court concluded that 
our Court had expanded 29 C.F.R. S 2510.3-3(c)(1) to 
exclude owners who were immediate family members from 
being counted as employees. Although the District Court 
questioned this holding, it felt bound by it. The District 
Court therefore concluded "that shareholders of a company, 
all of whom are immediate family members, are owners, not 
employees for purposes of determining whether a plan is 
covered by ERISA" and held that the Pension and Profit 
Sharing Plans were not covered by ERISA. App. at 13a, 17a. 
 
The District Court misinterpreted Matinchek. The Court 
in Matinchek was called upon to decide only whether ERISA 
governed an insurance plan covering a husband and wife 
who co-owned a business. It was not asked to decide 
whether ERISA would also govern a policy that covered 
other immediate family who jointly owned a business. As a 
result, even if the Court's footnote is read as suggesting 
that immediate family members who jointly own a company 
do not count as employees, that assertion is merely dictum. 
 
Moreover, the Matinchek Court did not hold that 29 
C.F.R. S 2510.3-3(c)(1) applies to immediate family 
members other than spouses. The Court stated "that an 
insurance coverage plan covering only a sole business 
owner and his or her immediate family members cannot 
qualify as an employee welfare benefit plan." Matinchek, 93 
F.3d at 101. This statement is uncontroversial. A sole 
business owner would not be counted as an employee 
under 29 C.F.R. S 2510.3-3(c)(1). If he or she bought an 
insurance policy covering immediate family members who 
were not employees or owners, the policy would not cover 
any employees and therefore would not be governed by 
ERISA. The same result would follow if the business were 
wholly owned by an individual and his or her spouse. 
 
The footnote in question merely explains that this 
principle does not change with the type of business 
organization at issue. If an individual is a sole proprietor, 
he or she may purchase insurance for immediate family 
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members who are not employees without the plan being 
subject to ERISA. The result is the same if the individual or 
the individual and his or her spouse are the sole 
shareholders. And if the owners are partners, they will not 
be counted as employees of the partnership even if they are 
not spouses, because 29 C.F.R. S 2510.3-3(c)(2) states that 
"[a] partner in a partnership and his or her spouse shall 
not be deemed to be employees with respect to the 
partnership." The footnote in Matinchek thus does not 
stand for the proposition that immediate family members, 
other than spouses, who wholly own a business are not to 
be counted as employees. 
 
Since Matinchek did not expand the reach of 29 C.F.R. 
S 2510.3-3(c)(1) beyond its plain language, we are left to 
apply the regulation as written. As noted, section 2510.3- 
3(c)(1) states: 
 
       An individual and his or her spouse shall not be 
       deemed to be employees with respect to a trade or 
       business, whether incorporated or unincorporated, 
       which is wholly owned by the individual or by the 
       individual and his or her spouse. 
 
The regulation only prevents spouses who wholly own a 
business from being counted as employees. See In re Metz, 
225 B.R. 173, 177 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1998) (plan covered by 
ERISA where former spouses were sole shareholders of 
corporation sponsoring plan); Provident Life & Accident Ins. 
Co. v. Cohen, 137 F. Supp. 2d 631, 635, 636 (D. Md. 2001) 
(noting that 29 C.F.R. S 2510.3-3(c)(1) "limits its reach to 
individuals (and their spouses) who `wholly' own a 
business" but does not address "a corporation's co-owners 
who are not married to each other," and holding that 
unmarried co-owners "were not explicitly excluded by the 
DOL regulation" from being counted as employees); Melluish 
v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
4595, at *9, *14-15 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2001) (person who 
was one of three owners of a corporation properly counted 
as an employee). Indeed, in a 1976 advisory opinion, the 
Department of Labor made clear that a pension or profit 
sharing plan covering only the shareholders of a company 
or their spouses would lie outside ERISA's scope"only 
where the stock of the corporation is wholly owned by one 
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shareholder and his or her spouse and the shareholder or 
the shareholder and his or her spouse are the only 
participants in the plan." Department of Labor, Pension & 
Welfare Benefit Programs, Opinion 76-67, 1976 ERISA 
Lexis 58 (May 21, 1976). 
 
It is undisputed that Janice was William's step-daughter, 
not his spouse. Because William and Janice were not 
spouses, they could be counted as employees, even though 
they were also owners. As a result, at the time of the 
distributions, both plans had at least one employee- 
participant. William was a participant in the Profit Sharing 
Plan, while both William and Janice were participants in 
the Pension Plan. Accordingly, both plans qualified as 
employee benefit plans under ERISA. See Vega v. Nat'l Life 
Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 1999) (The 
company's "employee benefit plan is an ERISA plan 
because it does not solely cover the Vegas, co-owners of the 
company; rather, it includes their employees, and[the 
company] employs at least one other person besides the 
Vegas."); Robinson v. Linomaz, 58 F.3d 365, 368 (8th Cir. 
1995) (Where group insurance policy purchased by 
company required that "non-owner, common law employee" 
be covered, the plan was governed by ERISA.).4 
 
III. 
 
Because both the Profit Sharing and Pension Plans were 
governed by ERISA, the District Court erred in dismissing 
plaintiffs' claims arising under Title I of ERISA. Accordingly, 
we reverse the District Court's order of dismissal and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Given our resolution of the case, we need not address plaintiffs' 
argument that 29 C.F.R. S 2510.3-3(c)(1) should not apply because it 
predated the REA and has not been amended since the REA was enacted 
in 1984. 
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